LEGAL ADVICE, PRISON VISITS AND INCARCERATION

In Attorney General of Lagos State v Keita (CA/L/477/2012)[2016] NGCA 87 (24 March 2016), the accused/respondent (a Nigerien) was arrested by the Police and arraigned before a magistrate court for the offence of manslaughter. He was remanded in prison custody following the order of the magistrate. He remained in prison custody for over 10 years without trial following which he sued the Commissioner of Police and Attorney General of Lagos State (appellant) for breach of his fundamental rights as provided by the constitution. The Commissioner of Police and the appellant did not file affidavit evidence countering the case of the respondent that he was detained in prison without trial for over 10 years for the offence of manslaughter. The High Court found in favour of accused/respondent and awarded N7m damages against the Commissioner of Police and the appellant jointly and severally. The N7 million award was enforced by garnishee proceedings against only the appellant. Thus appellant appealed against the decision arguing that:

“although the office of the Attorney-General occupies a very special position in the scheme of governance, cases brought to Court by the Police without forwarding duplicate case files with respect to them for the purpose of issuance of legal advice cannot be said to be within the constructive knowledge and control of the office of the Attorney-General.”

The appellant therefore called upon the Court of Appeal to overturn “the judgement of the high court holding it jointly responsible for the incarceration of the respondent as no duplicate case regarding the respondent’s case was forwarded to it by the commissioner of police.”

The respondent on the other hand argued that:

“…the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of the Lagos State 2007 (ACJL 2007) and its successor, the Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2011 (ACJL 2011) which provide procedural rules for pending and fresh criminal prosecution in the Magistrate Courts and the High Courts of Lagos State place a burden on the appellant with certain ministerial responsibilities not only to undertake and take over criminal prosecution and/or discontinue such criminal prosecutions with respect to offences the Attorney-General of the State is authorised by law to prosecute, the appellant is further charged with the responsibility to monitor and control any remand proceedings for indictable offences in a Magistrate Court thus placing on the appellant the ministerial responsibility to intervene and discontinue remand proceedings in a Magistrate Court.”

The respondent submitted, that the appellant having failed to carry out its  duty as stated above, it was right for the trial court to have held appellant jointly liable for the incarceration of the respondent.

The court in deciding the appeal considered the following provisions of the relevant laws which are reproduced herein below:

Section 72(1) of ACJL 2011 (which is the same as Section 72 of ACJL 2007) provides that:

"(1) In any remand proceedings with respect to any indictable offence against a law before a Magistrate, the Attorney-General of the State may indicate to the Court either personally by himself, or through any of the officers in his chambers in writing, informing the Magistrate by way of legal advice through the prosecuting Police Officer or a Law Officer that the State intends that the proceedings shall be discontinued and thereupon the suspect shall immediately be discharged in respect of the offence."

Section 74 (1), (2) and (3) thereof states thus-

“(1) The Commissioner of Police shall forward all duplicate case files with respect to indictable offences to the office of the Attorney-General for the purpose of issuance of legal advice.

(2) The legal advice issued by the office of the Attorney-General with respect to such indictable offences or any person shall be conclusive.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the Attorney-General may request for duplicate files relating to any offence for the purpose of issuance of legal advice."

Section 264(1), (6) and (7) of ACJL 2011 (formerly Section 268(1), (6) and (7) of ACJL 2007) provides that:

"(1) Any person arrested for any offence triable on Information shall within a reasonable time of arrest be brought before a Magistrate for remand and the Magistrate shall have powers to remand such a person after examining the reasons for the arrests exhibited in the request form filed by the Police, and if satisfied that there is probable cause to remand such person pending legal advice of the Director of Public Prosecution or the arraignment of such person before the appropriate Court or Tribunal.

(6) At the expiration of the further order made pursuant to Subsection (5) above, the Magistrate shall issue a hearing notice to the Commissioner of Police and/or Director of Public Prosecutions and adjourn the matter in order to inquire as to the position of the case and for the Commissioner of Police and for Director of Public Prosecution to show cause why the person remanded should not be released.

(7) The Magistrate shall extend the order to remand only if satisfied that there is a good cause and that necessary steps have been taken to arraign the person before an appropriate Court of Tribunal.”

Having considered the above provisions the court held that:

“Section 74(3) of ACJL 2011 would not serve as the platform to impute constructive knowledge of the remand proceedings on the appellant on the footing that it is intended to empower the appellant, regardless of the nature of the offence, whether triable on information as stated in Section 72(1) of ACJL 2011, or not triable on information, to unlimited powers to call for the duplicate case file for legal advice; and, which ministerial power is, in my considered opinion, expected to be exercised only in cases the appellant is aware of the remand proceedings.”

The court further held that:

“…because there is no indication in the record that the Commissioner of Police or the person(s) acting under him forwarded the case diary or duplicate case file to the appellant for legal advice. It is also not indicated in the record that the appellant was in any way aware of the remand proceedings at the material time. Nor did the remanding Magistrate inform the appellant through the DPP of the remand proceedings as required by Section 264(6) of ACJL 2011. It follows logically and factually that the appellant was not cognizant of the pending remand proceedings.”

The court therefore concluded per Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, J.C.A. (delivering the Leading Judgment) that: “It is on the premise (supra) that I am of the modest opinion that the appellant should not have been found liable for the infringement of the respondents right to personal liberty in the circumstances of the case.”

COMMENTS
Chinwe Eugenia Iyizoba, J.C.A who concurred with the leading judgement, made a remark which may be considered as a subtle indictment on the system of criminal justice administration in Lagos State as at the relevant period (the over 10 years period during which the respondent was incarcerated without trial) when she stated that: “I thought prison visits by Chief Judges were supposed to fish out and take action in cases such as this. For these cases to have escaped their attention there might be need to review their procedure.”