When Power Players Expose Mass Surveillance: The El-Rufai Wiretapping Saga and the Cybercrimes Paradox

A high-profile airport confrontation has pulled back the curtain on alleged warrantless surveillance apparatus, but who investigates the investigators?

The recent clash between former Kaduna State Governor Nasir El-Rufai and National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu has exposed a troubling double standard at the heart of the digital rights framework in Nigeria. While legal experts like Abuja-based lawyer Pelumi Olajengbesi correctly point out that phone tapping constitutes a serious criminal offense under the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, 2015, El-Rufai's counter-allegations raise a more fundamental question: what happens when the suspected perpetrator is the state itself?

The Accusations

Following his attempted arrest at Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in February, 2026, El-Rufai publicly admitted to listening to an intercepted phone conversation in which Ribadu allegedly ordered his detention. But he didn't stop there. In a revealing statement, the former governor declared: "The government thinks that they're the only ones that listen to calls...the government does it all the time. They listen to our calls all the time without a court order."

This isn't just political mudslinging. These words come from someone who has operated at the highest levels of governance; a former minister and two-term governor with intimate knowledge of state security operations. His allegations carry institutional weight precisely because of this is insider perspective.

The Legal Framework vs. Reality

The legal framework for electronic surveillance appears comprehensive on paper.  Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) guarantees the right to privacy  of  citizens,  their  homes,  correspondence,  telephone conversations  and  telegraphic  communications.

Furthermore, Section 12(1) of the Cybercrimes Act, 2015 (as amended) is explicit: "Any person, who intentionally and without authorization, intercepts by technical means, non-public transmissions of computer data, content, or traffic data... commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than 2 years or to a fine of not more than N5,000,000.00 or to both."

The law makes no exception for government officials. The prohibition applies to "any person", a deliberate choice of words that encompasses both private individuals and state actors.

The Warrant Requirement

Section 39 of the Cybercrimes Act and the Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2018 establish strict conditions for lawful interception. A judge may only authorize interception "where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the content of any electronic communication is reasonably required for the purposes of a criminal investigation or proceedings."

The Regulations further specify that a warrant is necessary except in narrowly defined emergency situations involving: immediate danger of death or serious injury, activities threatening national security and organized crime activities.

Even in these emergency circumstances, Regulation 12(4) mandates that the authorized agency "shall apply for a Warrant to the Judge within 48 hours after the interception has occurred... and where the application is not made, or denied within 48 hours, the interception shall terminate immediately and further interception shall be treated as unlawful."

Who Can Request Interception?

Under Regulation 12(1) the Office of the National Security Adviser (represented by the NSA or designee not below Assistant Commissioner rank) or the State Security Services (represented by the Director or designee of equivalent rank).

Notably, the NSA, Nuhu Ribadu himself, is one of only the few officials empowered to seek lawful interception orders. This makes El-Rufai's allegation that Ribadu ordered his surveillance particularly significant: if such interception occurred without judicial authorization, the very official charged with seeking warrants lawfully may have bypassed the legal process entirely.

The Reality: Systematic Circumvention?

Yet El-Rufai's claims that "The government does it all the time. They listen to our calls all the time without a court order", suggest a pattern of systematic circumvention, not by rogue actors, but by the very state apparatus charged with upholding these laws.

If true, this represents a fundamental breakdown of the rule of law. The regulations impose severe penalties for non-compliance: N5,000,000 fines for violations, plus N500,000 daily penalties for continuing offenses (Regulation 16). These penalties apply to "any person, Licensee or its officers" again, no carve-out for government agencies. Section 12 of the Cybercrimes Act also criminalizes unlawful interceptions of communications.

The legal framework is therefore, clear. The alleged practice, as described by a former governor with insider knowledge, appears to violate it systematically. This gap between law and practice transforms surveillance regulations from protective shields into paper tigers which are enforced against citizens while ignored by those in power.

The Expanding Surveillance Infrastructure

El-Rufai's allegations align disturbingly with documented evidence of growing surveillance capabilities in Nigeria. According to research from the Institute of Development Studies, Nigeria has spent billions of dollars acquiring sophisticated surveillance technology. The country has procured systems capable of monitoring communications, tracking locations, and conducting mass data collection, often with minimal transparency or oversight.

The Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University reports that Nigeria's surveillance ecosystem includes partnerships with international technology vendors and deployment of invasive monitoring tools. These systems operate in what researchers describe as a legal grey zone, where the technological capacity for surveillance far outpaces regulatory frameworks designed to protect citizens' privacy.

The Harvard research notes that authorities have acquired tools for intercepting mobile communications, monitoring internet traffic, and collecting metadata on citizens' digital activities which is precisely the kind of warrantless surveillance El-Rufai now alleges is routine practice.

The Financial and Human Cost

The scale of investment in surveillance infrastructure is staggering. As the IDS study reveals, the country has channeled billions into surveillance technologies even as critical public services remain underfunded. This spending occurs largely outside public scrutiny, with procurement processes that lack transparency and accountability mechanisms.

More troubling still, these surveillance capabilities have allegedly been deployed not primarily for national security purposes, but for monitoring political opposition, civil society activists, and journalists. The Harvard analysis documents cases where surveillance tools have been used to target dissenting voices rather than genuine security threats. A pattern consistent with El-Rufai's claims about politically motivated monitoring.

The Accountability Vacuum

Lawyer Olajengbesi has called for security agencies to investigate El-Rufai's admission of listening to intercepted communications. But this raises the paradox at the heart of this affair: Who investigates allegations against the government when the government controls the investigative machinery?

The Harvard research highlights a critical gap in Nigeria's digital rights architecture: the absence of independent oversight bodies with real power to monitor and sanction state surveillance activities. While the Cybercrimes Act and the Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2018 theoretically requires judicial authorization for interception, researchers found that compliance mechanisms are weak and enforcement is selective.

If El-Rufai's broader allegations are accurate, i.e., that warrantless mass surveillance of citizens' phone calls and online activities is routine government practice, then Nigerians face a surveillance state operating outside its own legal framework. The Cybercrimes Act and the Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2018, becomes merely decorative legislation, enforced selectively against citizens while the state enjoys de facto immunity.

The Technology Behind the Surveillance

According to IDS findings, the government of Nigeria has acquired sophisticated interception systems capable of real-time monitoring of telecommunications networks. These systems can capture voice calls, text messages, and internet communications without leaving traces detectable to the targets. The infrastructure includes both passive collection systems and active interception capabilities and this makes El-Rufai's claim about routine, warrantless call monitoring technically plausible.

The Berkman Klein Center's investigation notes that telecommunications providers in Nigeria are often compelled to cooperate with security agencies, sometimes through informal pressure rather than legal process. This creates a system where lawful interception procedures can be bypassed entirely, with communications accessed directly through telecoms infrastructure.

What This Means for Digital Rights

This confrontation between political heavyweights inadvertently validates long-held suspicions within the digital rights community: that citizens' communications are subject to systematic, warrantless monitoring. Civil society organizations have raised these concerns for years, often dismissed as conspiracy theories. When someone of El-Rufai's stature; with decades navigating power corridors, makes such allegations, it demands serious attention.

The Harvard study emphasizes that unchecked surveillance powers fundamentally undermine democratic participation. When citizens cannot communicate privately, they cannot organize effectively, hold government accountable, or exercise their rights to free expression and assembly. The chilling effect of pervasive surveillance extends far beyond those directly targeted.

The Way Forward

1.   Independent oversight mechanisms for state surveillance activities with real enforcement power as recommended by researchers at IDS, including civilian oversight boards with subpoena power and security clearances to audit surveillance operations.

2. Transparency reports from telecommunications providers and security agencies about interception requests and warrants, a practice the Berkman Klein Center identifies as essential for accountability in democratic societies.

3. Judicial reforms ensuring that interception warrants are genuinely scrutinized, not rubber-stamped, with specialized courts trained in digital rights and surveillance law.

4. Legislative review of the Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2018 to close loopholes enabling abuse and align the Regulation with international human rights standards.

5.  Equal application of cybercrime laws, whether the accused is a citizen or state actor.

6.  Public disclosure of surveillance procurement contracts and capabilities, as called for by civil society researchers, to enable informed democratic debate about surveillance powers.

Conclusion

The irony is stark: laws designed to protect electronic privacy may be routinely violated by those charged with enforcing it. While El-Rufai's own admission warrants investigation, his counter-allegations expose a potentially far graver systemic problem. The documented evidence of multi-billion dollar surveillance infrastructure in the country, combined with research showing weak oversight mechanisms, suggests El-Rufai may be revealing an open secret within the power elite.

Until the country establishes genuine accountability for state surveillance activities, the Cybercrimes Act and Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2018 will remain what many fear they already are i.e., tools for controlling citizens rather than protecting their digital rights.

The question remains unanswered: In a democracy, when the government allegedly breaks the law on a mass scale, who investigates?